From ced100813c147e2fc3ca692ddc52876ed2358c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aiqiao Yan <55104035+aiqiaoy@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 16:34:16 -0400
Subject: backport `allow-unsafe-pr-checkout` to v2 (#2504)

* block checking out fork pr for pull_request_target and workflow_run (#2454)

* block checking out fork pr for some events

* address copilot and reviewer feedback

* run prettier formatting

* build

* update urls

* update readme

* update description and url again

* edit url one more time

* update error wording (#2467)

* bump upload-artifact

* rebuild
---
 action.yml | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

(limited to 'action.yml')

diff --git a/action.yml b/action.yml
index b786263..9f346aa 100644
--- a/action.yml
+++ b/action.yml
@@ -71,6 +71,15 @@ inputs:
   set-safe-directory:
     description: Add repository path as safe.directory for Git global config by running `git config --global --add safe.directory <path>`
     default: true
+  allow-unsafe-pr-checkout:
+    description: >
+      Required to check out fork pull request code from a workflow triggered by
+      `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. These workflows run with the
+      base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch cache scope, and
+      runner access; fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted
+      context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. Set to `true`
+      only after reviewing the risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target.
+    default: false
 runs:
   using: node12
   main: dist/index.js
-- 
cgit v1.2.3